Will the war spread to Belarus?

Since Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk, there has been a lot of speculation about the potential of Belarus becoming an active part in the war. Belarus deployed more forces to the border with Ukraine, and the Ukrainian foreign ministry reacted with some unusually strong warnings. The message was that Ukraine saw the Belarusian troop concentration as a threat.

Then there have been some puzzling incidents where the Belarusian air force has engaged Russian drones that crossed the border. The drones were probably headed for Ukraine, but the Belarusian forces shot them down.

The conventional perspective is that Belarus is an ally of Russia, but that they have so far been reluctant to engage actively in the war. Lukashenko has been able to divert the pressure from Moscow by providing just enough to keep Putin happy. They have allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory to attack Ukraine, and they have provided some weapons and ammunition to the Russian war effort. But the view is also that Belarus could be pressured into engaging in the war if Putin really wants it.

After I released my latest frontline update, I got a question on Mastodon about why I did not mention the threat from Belarus, and whether that meant that I did not consider it likely that Belarus would attack. My response was a bit cryptic.

I thought it was worth explaining what I meant in a newsletter. Remember that I am not predicting that Ukraine will attack Belarus, but I think it’s worth thinking about the possibility. If we add up the risks and benefits for the two sides in a confrontation, then a good argument can be made that the “next Kursk offensive” could happen in Belarus.

Belarus is a fragile state

Belarus is a small country and they do not have a strong military. There are about 45.000 soldiers in the Belarusian military, and they do not have modern equipment. That is the explanation for why it is unlikely that Belarus will succumb to pressure from Russia and engage directly in the war: They would be absolutely destroyed by the much stronger Ukrainian military.

But the important thing to note is that Belarus is a fragile state. There were massive protests in 2020, where it looked like Alexander Lukashenko might lose the grip on power, and the dissatisfaction with the regime is simmering just beneath the surface. Belarus could potentially be Ukraine’s strongest ally in the fight against Russian hegemony, because the two countries have similar circumstances in many ways. Ukraine took a different turn in 2004 when the Orange Revolution established the foundations of real democracy, while authoritarianism until now has maintained the grip on Belarus.

Ukraine becoming a new Belarus – or vice versa

I often make the analogy that Putin’s strategic goal with the war is to turn Ukraine into a clone of Belarus. (Many people still believe that the war is about territory in Eastern Ukraine, but that is a misunderstanding.) It is Putin’s ambition to roll back democracy in Ukraine and to have a puppet regime in Kyiv that he can control.

But what if the outcome of the war is not that Ukraine becomes Belarus, but the opposite? One of the goals of Ukraine’s operations in Kursk is to politicize the Russian population by making them feel the consequences of the war. However, it is a difficult task. The average Russian is so depoliticized that it can take a long time before we see widespread protests. But in Belarus it is absolutely possible that it could happen quickly. A confrontation between Ukraine and Lukashenko’s regime could be the catalyst for something bigger, and Zelensky could even become the liberator who brought home the country’s rightfully elected president, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

One thing that could lead to a genuine collapse of the Russian war effort is the fall of Lukashenko. In the bigger perspective Belarus is manyfold more important than Donbas for Russia’s strategic interests. Putin could not allow that to happen, but where would he find the forces to intervene?

Until now the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk has not led to massive diversion of Russian forces from Eastern Ukraine, but that would almost certainly have to be the consequence if the alternative is to lose Belarus. It is ironic that Putin can practically ignore an invasion of his own country, but an incursion in Belarus would have to trigger a big reaction.

Hiding a buildup

One of the ways Ukraine was able to keep the preparations for the Kursk offensive secret was that they happened under the guise of Ukrainian concerns of a Russian attack. For months they had been talking about how the Russians were preparing an attack in the Sumy region akin to the Kharkiv offensive, and that gave cover for an increased concentration of forces on the Ukrainian side.

Now we are suddenly hearing the Ukrainians talking about a possible attack from Belarus. It would not be outrageous for Lukashenko to be concerned about whether his border is the next one where Ukraine will want to establish a buffer zone. Suddenly we are seeing the Belarusian air force shooting down Shahed drones, which could be Lukashenko’s attempt at defusing the situation. If Belarus is shooting down the Russian drones, it is harder for Ukraine to argue that they need a buffer zone.

The war is still escalating

It is hard to predict what Ukraine will do next, and definitely there would also be disadvantages for Ukraine in involving Belarus. Ukraine’s Western allies are unlikely to approve of such a step, and it would also be problematic in terms of international law. But I think it is important to understand that the war is in a process of escalation.

The Western (i.e. American) policy of escalation management has essentially failed, and we will see Ukraine taking new steps to increase the pressure on Putin. I think it’s important that we don’t limit our imagination in terms of what that might entail. It is possible that Belarus can end up being involved in the war, and it might be in Ukraine’s interest to take this step.

Countries in war do dramatic and risky things, and if they believe that escalation against Belarus can help them win the war, then they will at least consider doing it regardless what their Western partners think about it. And ironically the more the Western countries withhold military support for Ukraine in the fight with Russia, the more likely it is that they will see the need to do something dramatic like bringing down the Lukashenko regime.