What will ATACMS mean for Ukraine?
Yesterday marked the 1000th day of the war, and Ukraine commemorated the day by using ATACMS missiles in Russia for the first time. It appears that a weapons storage facility in the Bryansk Oblast has been hit.
According to the Russians, the attack was a failure because all six missiles were shot down. Unfortunately, debris from one of them caused a fire on the ground, but this was quickly brought under control. There were no significant material damages and no casualties. At least that's the Russian version. Images that have started to circulate online suggest that there is significant damage and that the attack was likely successful.
It is worth considering why this attack was such a big deal. On the one hand, it is yet another one of Russia's red lines that has been crossed, and most likely, nothing will happen as a consequence. Typically, in these cases, before a decision has been made to allow Ukraine to use a certain weapon system, Russia will talk about it as if it is going to lead to escalation and have catastrophic consequences. But the moment the decision is made, the communication from Russia typically changes 180 degrees. The rhetoric will instead be that this weapon system is totally irrelevant and that it will not make any difference on the battlefield, and that it’s a complete waste of money to give it to Ukraine. The same thing will probably happen this time.
ATACMS were a self-imposed red line
But I think the really interesting question is why this has become a red line for Russia in the first place. The decision to allow Ukraine to strike with Western weapons on Russian territory was made back in May, and it has included most weapons systems that the West has provided to Ukraine since the invasion. At the time, there was the same discussion about this step being a red line and that if Ukraine was allowed to hit any target on Russian territory with any weapon, it would lead to disastrous escalation.
Joe Biden decided to give permission anyway, but instead of taking the full step, it was specified that the use of ATACMS missiles was excluded from the permission. This was Biden's choice. He could also have decided to allow Ukraine to use whatever weapons they wanted. But by excluding the ATACMS from the list, he handed Putin a chance to establish a new red line regarding the use of long-range missiles.
So, that's how we have ended up in this strange situation where the discussion about Western weapons hitting Russian territory has become a red line twice. It has always been a strange talking point for the Russian authorities because it is very hard to argue that the territory within 50 to 60 kilometers of Ukraine is not as sacred as the rest of Russia. Somehow, the Russian politicians still managed to create the impression that this red line was very important and that missiles with a range greater than this are a unique and particularly aggressive weapon.
In other words, the idea that ATACAM's missiles are a special category of weapons that would be a meaningful red line is created entirely by the Biden administration because they didn't take the full step back in May. The Ukrainians have been frustrated by this situation because they have perceived it as a strange, artificial restriction that has led to a loss of Ukrainian lives, because they have been unable to strike at Russian logistics and air bases.
What is Ukraine allowed to do?
The big question now is, of course, whether Ukraine is finally getting what it wants: The ability to strike any targets they want within a 300-kilometer range from the Ukrainian border. Ukraine already has the capability to strike these weapons with many of their domestically produced drones and missiles. However, the addition of Western missiles, such as ATACMS or Storm Shadow, would make a real difference. These missiles can carry a much larger payload than the Ukrainian drones, and ATACMS has a great ability to penetrate air defenses because it is a ballistic missile. If the restrictions are lifted and Ukraine is provided with a large number of missiles, this could have a significant impact on the war. It could limit Russia's ability to conduct ranged attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and ease the pressure on the frontline by reducing Russia's use of glide bombs.
But those are some important "ifs." It seems that the permission from Biden is mostly limited to the area around Kursk. In that case, there is a much smaller number of targets that Ukraine can strike. It is also far from obvious that Ukraine will receive a substantial number of missiles. Ukraine first received and used ATACMS missiles back in April, but clearly in limited quantities. They have used them to strike targets in the occupied areas, but there has been a long period where the missiles have been suspiciously absent. This indicates that Ukraine simply didn't have any to shoot.
It will be interesting to see which of these scenarios will play out in practice. Is it going to be the full package, or will the use of ATACMS be limited to the area around Kursk? I think it's too early to tell. Some people have pointed out that the attack yesterday was against a storage facility in the Bryansk region and not in Kursk, and that this indicates that Ukraine is allowed to strike anywhere. But I think that is reading too much into it. If Ukraine's use of ATACMS is limited to targets relevant to the Kursk operation, it would almost certainly not be constrained by the arbitrary locations of Russia's internal administrative borders. Just because this specific target was located a few kilometers into the neighboring Bryansk region does not mean that Ukraine can do whatever they want.
While it is definitely a positive development that Ukraine finally has permission to use these missiles on Russian territory, it is also important not to get too excited. There is a good chance that this will improve Ukraine's position in the Kursk region, but not much more. To know the extent of the new permission, we just have to wait and see. But unfortunately, I think there is a good chance that people will be disappointed either by learning that the limitations are still quite restrictive or that the quantity of missiles provided to Ukraine is much lower than desired.