Russia is threatening nuclear war – again

The nuclear threats are back. There is been a fairly long period of time, where the Russians haven’t been talking so much about nuclear war, and where we haven’t seen significant threats about escalation. But now the nuclear rhetoric is back, and from various angles in the Russian system we are again witnessing more or less direct threats about the potential of the war in Ukraine turning into a nuclear Armageddon.

So just to list some of the examples of how this nuclear rhetoric is back, over the last few weeks we have witnessed the following: On Russian state TV, propagandist in chief Dmitry Kiselyov is threatening that if NATO troops are deployed to Ukraine, Russia will conduct nuclear strikes against NATO countries. The Russian Defense Ministry has announced that they are launching exercises with tactical nuclear weapons. (Just for the record, that does not mean that they will blow off a nuclear bomb. It just means that they will be practicing the procedures.) Belarus quickly followed suit and also announced that they will be conducting exercises with a nuclear element, where they will be receiving and using tactical nuclear weapons from Russia. In the Russian Foreign Ministry has announced that when Ukraine gets F-16 fighter jets, Russia is going to consider all of them potential carriers of nuclear weapons, and that they are not going to distinguish between the different generations of F-16s in this regard.

The last statement is particularly inane. First, even if a particular type of F-16s can theoretically carry nuclear weapons, not even the Russians can credibly believe that the Western countries would donate this type of ammunition to Ukraine. There are not many red lines left in terms of what types of equipment the Western countries will give to Ukraine, but donating a nuclear bomb is certainly one of them. And second, it’s impossible to understand what practical difference it makes if they consider these fighter jets to be potential carriers of nuclear weapons. Were they not going to try to shoot them down if they were just carriers of conventional weapons? 

Why nuclear rhetoric is back
In general, the level of nuclear saber rattling is an indicator of how self-confident the Russians feel. When things are going well for them, and they believe that they are on the path to victory with a sustainable level of conventional forces, then the nuclear rhetoric is toned down. But when they feel under pressure and insecure, then we hear more talk about nuclear weapons. So when we suddenly start hearing nuclear threats again after some time where they have been absent, then that is an indication that the Russians are starting to feel less confident.

The most important reason for this is that Ukraine’s Western partners finally seem to have gotten their act together after the disappointment of last year’s failed counteroffensive. The American assistance package has been approved by Congress, and the weapons are now flowing into Ukraine. This will keep Ukraine supplied well into 2025, and it is a development that the Russians had not expected. They thought the assistance package would continue to be blocked in the House of Representatives, and that their current military efforts would be enough to ensure significant and potentially decisive victories over the summer.

But the Americans actually went further than just resuming the previous levels of support for Ukraine. The provision of ATACMS missiles has allowed Ukraine to target the air defense systems in Crimea to an unprecedented extent, and the Russians are now concerned about the potential of this clearing the path for a strike on the Kerch bridge.

But also things from the European scene are worrying for the Russians. The statement from the French president Macron that he will not rule out the possibility of French soldiers potentially being deployed to Ukraine is hitting much harder in Moscow than I think many people in the West appreciate. This is something that they are genuinely concerned about, and it shows that the French president was right when he pointed out the value of strategic ambiguity in our messaging.

Also the message from British Foreign Secretary David Cameron that Ukraine can now use British weapons to hit targets inside of Russia has had a significant psychological impact in Moscow. From a military point of view it is silly that Ukraine has received weapons from Western partners with a bunch of caveats about not using them to strike targets on the Russian side of the border. But now, the UK is leading the way in getting rid of this limitation, which in practical terms means that Ukraine can now use Storm Shadow missiles to hit targets hundreds of kilometers on the Russian side of the border. The number of potential targets in this area is enormous, and there is no way that Russia can protect all of them.

Finally, the Russians are worried about the fairly successful Ukrainian drone campaign inside of Russia, most significantly against their oil infrastructure. This is something that can potentially put the Russian war economy so much under pressure that it leads to a premature collapse. 

This person is the target audience of Russia's nuclear rhetoric.Photo: Federal Government/photothek.net/Thomas Köhler & Thomas Imo

Biden and Scholz are susceptible to blackmail
Russia is nowhere close to actually using nuclear weapons at this point. Putin has still not had the guts to admit to his people that what is going on in Ukraine is a war, and instead he’s clinging on to the silly rhetoric of “a special military operation”. He has also not taken the step of launching systematic mobilization, and also they have held back from the unpopular step of deploying conscript soldiers to Ukraine. I think it’s fair to say that if you have still not felt the need to deploy the conscripts, then you will also not be at a point where you find it necessary to use nuclear weapons.

So rather than assuming that the nuclear rhetoric is about a practical use of nuclear weapons, we should see it as a kind of reckless diplomatic messaging. The nuclear threats have worked for Moscow before, in that it has caused the Western countries to put restraints on the types of assistance they have provided to Ukraine. This is the effect they are hoping to achieve again. Either by causing the Western countries to reconsider the support for Ukraine or by delaying the decisions enough to give the Russian forces better conditions during the summer offensive.

The target audience of Russia’s nuclear blackmail is therefore the same people in the West that have been susceptible to this kind of pressure before. First, it is Berlin. Many Western countries are now providing long-range missiles to Ukraine, but Germany is still holding back. Chancellor Scholz is still blocking the deliveries of Taurus missiles, and Russia would like to keep it that way. Scholz has previously demonstrated that he is susceptible to nuclear blackmail and threats of escalation, so there is a good chance that the nuclear rhetoric will work on him.

And second, it is Washington. Until recently, the United States has hesitated to provide long-range fires to Ukraine, and the reason has been that president Biden has been very concerned about escalation management. Now the decision has been made to deliver ATACMS missiles to Ukraine, because it has become obvious that this capability is necessary for Ukraine to prevail in the long run. The Russians understand that this decision has been made, but they would like to limit the number of missiles that Ukraine is getting, and most importantly they want the United States to keep delivering these missiles with geographical limitations about where they can be used. Right now they have to deal with the problem of ATACMS in Crimea, and that is bad enough. The last thing they want is for president Biden to get inspired by David Cameron and announce that Ukraine is free to use ATACMS wherever they want.