Maritime hybrid war is here to stay
By Alexander With:
Russia is waging a hybrid war against NATO in general, and in particular against the European countries that are most actively helping Ukraine. The war is being fought with every tool in the Russian toolbox, including, but not limited to, sabotage, cyberattacks, subversion, violations of sovereignty, fake news, and threats. It is a war beneath the threshold of conventional war. Attacks are common, but they rarely cause casualties. Instead, they cause fear, uncertainty, and economic damage, as well as minor disruption of military aid to Ukraine.
In a way, the hybrid war is a sign of Russian frustration and weakness. Russia is unable to bring the war in Ukraine to a satisfactory end, and the Russian economy is struggling under a combination of sanctions and Ukrainian attacks on critical infrastructure. This leaves few options for Putin. Assuming that he is not going to simply admit defeat and stop the war, he will try to escalate where he can.
Conventional escalation is difficult. On the one hand, Europe is weak. On the other hand, the bulk of the Russian army is occupied in Ukraine and unable to start a new war against NATO as long as the war in Ukraine is still being waged. Finally, while the US under the Trump administration has been giving mixed signals, Putin cannot be certain that America would not come to Europe’s aid in case of a war, and even the most fanatical Russians would have to admit that the US military is much stronger than the Russian.
This leaves Putin with only two real options on the table: nuclear threats and possibly nuclear escalation, and hybrid warfare. Since Russia has been making nuclear threats since the beginning of the war, that card has been played so many times that it is unlikely to produce much effect anymore. Like the boy who cried wolf, the Russians have made NATO accustomed to nuclear sabre-rattling.
Real nuclear escalation, on the other hand, is very risky. Even a tactical nuke on a minor Ukrainian target would be like opening Pandora’s box. No one would know how major powers such as the US, India, and China would react, but it is almost certain that they would react with outrage. So far, Putin has clearly been reluctant to push the button. This leaves hybrid warfare as the most desirable option for Russia.
Hybrid warfare can be waged with relatively little risk, and the perpetrator can turn the intensity of it up and down, thereby controlling the level of escalation. The maritime domain is especially susceptible to hybrid warfare. Ships sailing in international waters and under another nation’s flag cannot be boarded by other navies without violating the sovereignty of the flag state. In the same way embassies are often safe havens for intelligence operations, ships can function as a relatively safe haven for hybrid warfare. Ships also have the advantage that they are operating in a domain with limited law enforcement and lots of ambiguity. It is difficult to have all suspicious vessels under constant observation, and there is nothing easier than disposing of evidence at sea.
This means that even if the victim of a hybrid attack decides to board a vessel and investigate, there is little chance of actually convicting any crew member. Finally, the ownership and handling structure is often murky in the shipping industry. In a case where a ship is detained and crew members can be prosecuted, it can be difficult to officially link the actual state behind the attack to the ship.
There have been plenty of examples of hybrid warfare using vessels. Ships have cut undersea cables in the Baltic Sea on multiple occasions. Ships from the Russian shadow fleet have been under suspicion for being launching platforms for drones flying over critical infrastructure. Russian fishing vessels have also been implicated in cutting undersea cables in the Norwegian Sea and near Svalbard. Finally, Russian warships have both violated the territorial waters of Baltic Sea countries, navigating recklessly near NATO warships and civilian vessels, as well as being platforms for jammers disrupting infrastructure on land.
Only in a few of these incidents have the victims of these attacks actually seized the vessel believed to be behind the attack, and so far there have been no convictions of crew. This makes maritime hybrid warfare an effective tool for causing fear and disruption with relatively little risk.
Given that hybrid warfare is the most risk-free way Putin can escalate, and given that maritime hybrid warfare in particular is difficult to counter, it is likely that we will see more of it. The severity will depend on Putin’s risk willingness, which in turn will depend on how the war in Ukraine is going for Russia. A future blog post will discuss how NATO can defend itself against maritime hybrid warfare.
About the author:
Alexander With is commander (OF-3) in the Royal Danish Navy and military analyst at the Royal Danish Defence College. His website is https://www.alexanderwith.dk