One last offensive to end the war?

By Alexander With

History shows that states often launch a major offensive when they expect a turning point in the war. The purpose is seldom total victory, but to enhance their diplomatic and military bargaining position, especially if the state is under pressure and finds the strategic situation unsustainable.

There is a growing debate in military circles whether Russia could attempt such a gambit. Russia’s strategic situation is not sustainable, with casualties surpassing recruitment and an economy under strain from years of war footing, international sanctions, and Ukrainian attacks on critical infrastructure. Unless something changes, Russia’s prospects of ending the war on favourable conditions do not look good. It therefore has an incentive to escalate if such a strategy could change its strategic position.

By showing strength through escalation, Russia could attempt to change the narrative in a war-weary Europe, where far-right opposition parties often argue for a more accommodating policy towards Russia. Already, European states find it difficult to agree on new sanctions that hurt the Russian economy, because these same sanctions also hurt European states. Should these far-right parties gain power in key European countries, Europe might find it more difficult to maintain its support for Ukraine. A successful offensive might also influence Kyiv’s willingness to pursue maximalist goals.

The problem is that offensives launched from a position of weakness or desperation seldom produce the desired strategic results. Germany’s Kaiserschlacht offensives on the Western Front in the spring of 1918 produced impressive results, but they cost Germany much of what it had left in terms of military resources and ultimately hastened the Allied victory.

Ironically, Germany tried the same strategy in 1944 with the same result, only a few hundred kilometres from where its 1918 offensive ultimately failed. In both cases, Germany sought to remedy a hopeless strategic situation with "one last offensive" that was never enough to turn the tide.

Even when successful, a large offensive might ultimately lead to catastrophe. The Russian Brusilov Offensive in 1916 was perhaps the most successful offensive of the First World War. It captured large amounts of territory and inflicted tremendous losses on Austria-Hungary that it could never replace. But it also came at an enormous cost in trained soldiers and economic resources that Russia already lacked, thereby worsening the problems that ultimately led to the Russian Revolution and the downfall of the Tsar.

Putin might attempt one last offensive to end the war, but like those before him, he might find that offensives launched from a position of strategic weakness are unlikely to produce the desired results. This might be especially true since Ukraine is in a good position to thwart any Russian offensive. With strategic depth and drone warfare favouring the defender, a Russian offensive might produce local gains at huge cost, but like the German offensives on the Western Front in 1918 and 1944, it would likely be absorbed and leave Russia weaker than before.

Perhaps a more frightening scenario is that Russia could decide on a more asymmetric approach. Ukraine is militarily strong but dependent on European money, while Europe is militarily weak. Russia might launch a war against European states to compel them to change their policy towards Ukraine. It sounds irrational, but the historical parallel is there. In 1941, the Japanese Army was bogged down in a seemingly endless war against China when Western economic sanctions hurt the Japanese economy to the point where it would be unable to sustain the war.

Rather than accept defeat, sunk-cost fallacy and a willingness to take risks led Japan to launch a surprise attack on the United States in a desperate attempt to escape the strategic quagmire it had itself created. It sounds crazy to start a war against the strongest power on Earth in order to avoid defeat in a regional war of conquest. But the Japanese thought differently. And historically, they were not alone.

In 1917, the German High Command could see that it was losing the First World War. The British naval blockade was strangling the German economy. In a desperate gambit, Germany decided to launch unrestricted submarine warfare, sinking every ship bound for the UK, neutral or not. This had the predictable result of bringing the US into the war, but the German calculation was that it would knock Britain out of the war before the US could mobilise its resources into military power.

The question therefore becomes how willing Putin is to take risks, which again depends on how desperate the Russian strategic situation becomes. Even more importantly, it depends on the reaction of the US and Putin’s perception of what that reaction might be. At present, such a move might still look too risky, but an increasingly pressured American president, who is spending precious American ammunition against Iran, might not be the best deterrent against Russian desperation.

About the author:

Alexander With is commander (OF-3) in the Royal Danish Navy and military analyst at the Royal Danish Defence College. His website is https://www.alexanderwith.dk