A Kharkiv counteroffensive 2.0?

In this week’s video I talked about Russia’s new Kharkiv offensive, and it’s fair to say that I was skeptical about the brilliance of this idea. Some people reached out to me because they felt I was too dismissive of the threat of a Russian breakthrough over the summer, and of course such a thing could happen. But I think that more likely than not, Ukraine will manage to stabilize the frontlines. The weapons technology in this war disproportionately favors the defender, and now that the Ukrainian stockpiles of weapons and ammunition’s are again being filled, it will be extremely difficult for Russia to make progress.

In this edition I want to take it a step further. Not only to a think it will be difficult for Russia to achieve their goals in the Kharkiv region, but potentially they have also gifted the Ukrainians some quite significant opportunities for symbolic or informational victories.

It is hard to overstate how important the information aspect is in this war, where Ukraine is dependent on the impression of the battlefield situation both in the Ukrainian population and among their Western partners. Having the ability to shape a beneficial narrative is incredibly important, and Russia’s incursion in the Kharkiv region does offer some opportunities for Ukraine.

Striking with Western weapons into Russia

The first opportunity is that the current situation gives Ukraine a perfect argument for why they should be allowed to strike with Western weapons inside Russia. Since the early days of the invasion, weapons from the West have been delivered with this caveat. It has served a political purpose in terms of escalation management and alliance cohesion in the West.

The escalation management angle has been about trying to ensure that Russia would not feel threatened by the weapons deliveries, and that they would not escalate by retaliating directly against Western countries. This escalation management argument has always been one of those red lines that the Western countries have imposed upon themselves, and in reality it never made sense. Russia was never going to escalate directly against Western countries because they had delivered weapons to Ukraine.

But the argument about escalation management has been important in the sense that some Western state leaders – most notably in Washington and Berlin – have been genuinely concerned about what the Russian reaction might be if Ukraine used their weapons on Russian territory. Having this caveat has been important for keeping the Western alliance together and staying united about providing weapons to Ukraine.

But from a military point of view it has never made sense. Ukraine is in their right to strike against the Russian military wherever they want, and militarily it is silly to argue that Russia should have a safe haven on their side of the border.

The Kharkiv offensive provides a perfect argument to Ukraine for why these limitations should be removed. When the fighting takes place literally along the international border, the consequences of the limitations are taken to absurd extremes. Technically speaking, a Ukrainian soldier would not be allowed to use his German provided rifle or his American provided 5.56 millimeter rifle ammunition to shoot at a Russian soldier standing on the other side of the border. Not even if the Russian soldier was shooting at him.

This is obviously a ridiculous example, and I would not expect any Ukrainian soldier to actually adhere to this rule. But the gist of the problem is exactly the same with other types of weapons. Ukraine cannot use Western provided artillery to shoot at Russian force concentrations, they cannot use GMLRS to strike at Russian logistics, and they can’t use ATACMS missiles to hit Russian airbases.

The Kharkiv offensive has brought this question to the top of the international agenda. The United Kingdom has already announced that Ukraine is free to use weapons provided from the UK to strike inside Russia, and it looks like France is about to follow suit. It will be interesting to see what the American position will be. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken made some comments during his visit to Kyiv where it sounded like the American position might be changing, but since then the American government has been backtracking on Blinken’s statements.

But really it is quite silly to argue that Ukraine is supposed to fend off a Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region without striking across the border, and it may end with the American government changing their position. If Russia’s Kharkiv offensive leads to Ukraine being allowed to use American weapons inside of Russia, then that will be a giant shot in the foot.

Scene for a Ukrainian 2024 counteroffensive?

It has been clear for a while that President Zelensky is concerned about the psychological impact of Ukraine fighting a prolonged defensive battle. He has talked about the need of regaining the initiative in the war to create a feeling of momentum and boost the morale. His concern is that if Ukraine does not demonstrate offensive results, then it will undermine the belief in Ukraine’s ability to win the war in the long run. Indeed, this concerns seemed to be one of the important disagreements between President Zelensky and former defense chief general Zaluzhny.

The problem is that from a military point of view, the war is currently in a state where a Ukrainian counteroffensive would be premature. A strong Ukrainian push into the Donetsk or the Zaporizhzhia Oblast would be costly in terms of casualties and have little chance of success against a strong Russian defense. For Ukraine to have offensive success in these areas, the Russian side will have to be weakened significantly through prolonged attrition, and this brings us into 2025 or maybe even 2026.

With Russia’s incursion into the Kharkiv region, Putin has essentially handed Zelensky an opportunity for a 2024 counteroffensive. If Ukraine can push Russia out of these areas, then that will be an enormous symbolic victory. Especially after Putin publicly has announced that the purpose of the attack is to establish a buffer zone along the international border. By doing that, Putin has taken personal ownership of the offensive and the anticipated results. It will now be a significant embarrassment for Putin if Russia is unable to hold on to these territories.

In contrast to the rest of the frontline, it is actually realistic that Ukraine can muster the forces for a successful counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region. By design, this area is supposed to be a light footprint effort by the Russians. That is why, for now, they have allocated some thirty to fifty thousand soldiers to the northern sector, while they have many more in other areas.

Ironically, what led to Ukraine’s extremely successful counteroffensive in Kharkiv in 2022 was that Russia let the area be insufficiently protected by too few soldiers. Maybe they are about to repeat that mistake in 2024.

A diversion for whom?

Many people argue that Russia’s incursion into the Kharkiv region is a diversion operation to draw Ukrainian resources away from other areas on the frontline. As I said in my video, that might be their thinking, but it might end up sucking in more Russian resources than Ukrainian ones.

If this attack leads to Ukraine being allowed to use American supplied weapons on Russian territory, then it will create huge demands for Russian equipment and personnel to deal with this new challenge – especially in terms of air defense.

And if Ukraine launches a Kharkiv counteroffensive 2.0, then Russia will have to allocate significant resources to avoid an embarrassing symbolic defeat. Even if Russia manages to defend their gains, having these territories in the Kharkiv region might end up becoming a resource drain that reduces their chances of success in what is supposedly the main effort in the Donetsk region.