Ukraine gives up on crossing the Dnipro – for now at least

This week, news came out that the Ukrainians are leaving Krynky. This is a city on the left (Russian controlled) side of the Dnipro River, where they have been trying to establish a foothold since around November.

It is a significant announcement, and to some extent it is the end of a phase in the war where the Ukrainians aspired to gain a foothold across the Dnipro – at least for now. The Ukrainians initiated the attacks across the river after the summer offensive last year where they struggled to make progress against the fortified Russian positions in other sectors of the frontline. The purpose was to stretch out the adversary by giving the Russian commanders more dilemmas. In round numbers, the frontline is about a thousand kilometers long, but in practical terms the part of the frontline that the Russian commanders had to defend during Ukraine’s summer offensive was only about half of that. The rest was covered by the Dnipro River, and the Russians could leave this section largely undefended because it was impossible for Ukraine to make a surprise offensive across the river.

So while the frontline seemed long, from a Ukrainian point of view it was also to compact. It allowed the Russians to concentrate the forces, which played into their preferred fighting style where results are produced through mass and overwhelming quantity of firepower.

The fight for Krynky

Early on, it looked like the Ukrainians might actually get a real foothold on the left bank of the river, and that this could potentially over time develop into a bridgehead. Pretty soon, however, it became clear that this was not going to happen. It was politically unacceptable in Moscow to let the Ukrainians develop their presence on the left bank, so significant resources were invested in pushing the Ukrainians back into the river.

Krynky became the last place where the Ukrainians had a long-term presence, and it was clearly a point of annoyance for the Russian commanders and politicians. I have lost count with how many times they have announced the final liberation of Krynky, and it was obviously a chapter that the Russians would like to close. But the problem for the Russians was that the Ukrainians kept reinforcing their presence in Krynky even after it was clear that it was not going to develop into a large bridgehead.

The left bank of the Dnipro River is located in the lowlands compared to the right bank which is at an elevated position. This meant that the Ukrainians were able to target the Russians with artillery and drones from an advantageous position across the river.

The Ukrainian rationale

There is no doubt that the Ukrainians took heavy losses in the battle for Krynky. The Ukrainians have admitted about 1000 dead or missing soldiers during this battle, and if we assume the usual rate of three wounded per dead soldier, then we get that the Ukrainians have lost some 4000 soldiers. That is a roughly an entire brigade, which is an enormous number considering that the operation ended without the Ukrainians actually gaining any territory, and that it has been clear for a long time that it was not going to happen. But the Ukrainians must have felt that it was worth it, and that the Russian casualties were bigger.

The battle for Krynky hurt the Russians in two ways. First, they took significant losses in the battle by sending soldiers into an area where the Ukrainians had the artillery and drone advantage. And second, it diverted resources from other sectors on the frontline. Most notably from the Zaporizhzhia area, since it is the same Russian general that was responsible for both the Krynky operation and the offensive in Zaporizhzhia. The Russian offensive in Zaporizhzhia has produced limited results, and it is possibly due to the persistent Ukrainian presence in Krynky that they have been able to withstand the Russian pressure in other places.

One interpretation of the announcement about Ukraine leaving Krynky is that it is an admission of defeat. That the Ukrainian commanders have finally realized that they cannot gain a permanent foothold across the Dnipro, and that the losses are unsustainable. But as I indicated in my recent frontline update, I suspect the real reason is connected to the things that are going on in the Kharkiv area.

It is widely assumed that that one of the objectives with Russia’s Kharkiv offensive was to divert Ukrainian resources away from the Eastern part of the frontline in Donetsk, and that hasn’t happened. But it does seem to me that it has diverted resources away from Krynky.

When Russia made the (quite frankly silly) decision to invade the Kharkiv region from the north and open up a new frontline, it offered the Ukrainians an even better opportunity to achieve the same goals as in Krynky. It made the frontline longer, and it created dilemmas for the Russian commanders about the allocation of forces. But it did this in an area where the Ukrainians don’t have to fight across a river, and they will have more advantages. It is therefore understandable if the Ukrainians choose to prioritize this direction instead.

No more river crossings?

Does that mean that Ukraine has given up all aspirations of attacking across the Dnipro River? Almost certainly not. I think it is more accurate to think of it as a reduction of the aspirations from gaining a permanent foothold to a strategy of raids. Ukrainian marines will continue to make trouble on the Russian controlled side of the river. This will ensure that the Russians have to maintain a significant presence in the area. And then I would not rule out the possibility entirely of the Ukrainians trying again at a later point in the war.

But for the time being, this was probably the end of the Ukrainian attempt to establish a basis for an attack toward Crimea from the west.