More maritime sabotage in the Baltic Sea

Literally minutes after I sent out my last newsletter, news broke about another cargo ship destroying cables in the Baltic Sea by dragging its anchor across the seabed. I thought I would send out a short addendum with my comments about the new case and the similarities and differences to the previous ones.

Similarities

First, to state the obvious, the cases are similar in the sense that a cargo ship has destroyed critical infrastructure on the seabed of the Baltic Sea by dragging its anchor across the seabed. This time, it is power lines and communication cables between Finland and Estonia. It's the third such case in a little over a year, and it obviously raises significant questions about the ability of the coastal states to protect their maritime infrastructure.

Not China this time

However, there are also significant differences, the first being that this time the suspect is not a Chinese ship. Instead, it was the tanker Eagle S that was sailing under a Cook Islands flag. This is a significant difference. As I speculated in my last newsletter, the incident with Yi Peng 3, where the coastal states of the Baltic Sea demonstrated their willingness to take action against sabotage, could be enough to deter China from participating in future incidents.

Eagle S is a ship in Russia's so-called Shadow Fleet, a term for a large number of tankers operating under dubious conditions, with unclear ownership, poor maintenance, and questionable insurance status. While the ship is not officially registered in Russia, it still means that Russia, this time, used a cargo ship to conduct the sabotage that was more directly under their control.

I could, of course, be wrong, and it is possible that we will again see a Chinese ship involved in sabotage like this. But for the time being it looks like the Yi Peng 3 experience was enough to deter China from participating in these kinds of activities. However, it was obviously not enough to deter Russia from continuing its campaign against maritime infrastructure in the Baltic Sea using other assets.

Caught red-handed

Another significant difference is that this time the Finnish Coast Guard was very quick to arrive at the location where the sabotage was taking place. Perhaps they were even there while it was still happening, and they were able to get photographic evidence showing Eagle S dragging its anchor across the seabed. This means the Finnish Coast Guard was able to arrest the ship and bring it to Finland for immediate inspection.

Enough is enough

The resolute action by the Finnish Coast Guard shows that there is determination among the coastal states in the Baltic Sea to put an end to this kind of sabotage. The first time it happened in 2023, there were almost no consequences because it came as a surprise to everyone, and the coastal states were not ready to intercept the cargo ship before it left the Baltic Sea. The second time was Yi Peng 3, and the coastal states demonstrated their determination to make a diplomatic row to send a message to the governments involved. The third time, we see an immediate arrest of the ship and a very public response.

It obviously also plays a role that China is a great power and the Cook Islands are not. It's just easier to confront the Cook Islands without fearing diplomatic consequences in other areas. But I think the most important aspect was that the coastal states were prepared and had thought the scenarios through.

Geography matters

It also matters that the incident took place in the Gulf of Finland, which is a narrow strait where it is easy for the Coast Guard to make a rapid response. And then it probably also played a role that it happened in Finland, which is a country that has the capability to respond and a mindset that favors action over rhetoric.

Legal aspects

In the case of Yi Peng 3, I speculated that it would run in the courts as a civil case about liability. However, I think there is a good chance that this time it will actually be a criminal case about sabotage against the captain of Eagle S. That seems to be the next logical legal escalation step that the Baltic coastal states can take, and it should serve as a decent deterrent for the next captain who is asked by Russia to do the same.

There are a couple of important things to keep in mind when considering the legal aspects of the case. The first point is that, from a legal perspective, this incident has nothing to do with Russia. It was not a Russian ship, the crew was not Russian, and the incident did not happen in Russia. This means that, as far as the Finnish investigators are concerned, there is no reason to talk with the Russian authorities about anything. If there is a conversation to be had with Russia about maritime sabotage, it will be up to the politicians to address it on a political level.

The second thing is that we must distinguish between the ship owner and the cargo owner in such a case. I see many people online arguing that the cargo should be confiscated, and the profit should cover the expenses to repair the damages. However, that will most likely not be possible. It is the ship that caused the damage, not the cargo, and the cargo owner will argue that they had nothing to do with the sabotage. It is like a situation where a truck carrying packages from Amazon is involved in an incident. We would not expect our packages to be confiscated to cover the driver’s liability.

Broader Western reaction

The last thing I will mention is that this time we see a significant reaction from both NATO and the European Union. There is now broad consensus in the Western bloc that this kind of maritime sabotage must stop. It will be interesting to see what specific consequences there will be and, for example, if we will see a stronger NATO maritime presence in the Baltic Sea.