How can Europe defend against Russian hybrid war at sea?
By Alexander With
For years, Russia has been conducting a hybrid warfare campaign against Europe. One of the most vulnerable targets of these hybrid attacks has been maritime infrastructure, with few attacks being attributed and even fewer culprits being brought to justice.
Maritime infrastructure is vulnerable due to so-called sea-blindness. People don’t live on the sea. As such, societies don’t have many eyes or ears at sea, law enforcement is scarce, and most people don’t give much thought to the security of maritime infrastructure. This is even more true for infrastructure beneath the sea, such as cables and pipelines. All of this creates vulnerability to everything from divers planting explosives to merchant ships dragging anchors over the seabed severing cables, to specialist submarines conducting sabotage in the ocean depths. As seen in Ukraine, maritime infrastructure such as bridges, harbors, and terminals is also vulnerable to a variety of attacks.
The threat is compounded by the fact that Russia can target not only infrastructure but also shipping. In my last post, I argued that EU states must be ready if or when Russia attacks ships sailing under the flag of EU member states, as was likely the case with M/V Chelsea 3 in October 2026, although it has never been officially attributed to Russia.
In this post, I will discuss how the EU should defend against maritime hybrid war through the same three-step action plan, whether the attack is against infrastructure or shipping.
The first step is resilience. Infrastructure should be hardened, hidden, dispersed, or defended. This can be done in many ways. The Chinese-flagged Yi Peng 3 cut several cables in the Baltic Sea and most likely attempted to do the same near the Danish island of Læsø. This was not successful however, due to the cables being “armored” with extra wires and dug into the seabed. Another example is oil rigs in the Gulf of Guinea, which have their own radar and patrol boat protection. Finally, the ability to repair or re-establish damaged infrastructure is vital for resilience.
The second step is surveillance. It is impossible to fight an adversary you cannot see. For most of history, sea-blindness has been difficult to overcome, but the advent of drones and AI has the potential to change that. A robust defense will involve having a multitude of sensors—some static, some mobile. Sonar on cables, radar and infrared cameras on oil rigs, and drones in the air, on the surface, and below the surface should be used to compile a massive set of surveillance data. AI should then analyze this data and flag any suspicious anomalies for human analysts, who can dispatch additional surveillance units to investigate. The good news is that this is becoming increasingly affordable. While not exactly cheap, the cost is dwarfed by the price of the conventional, manned platforms that navies, coast guards, and air forces have relied on before and still do.
The bad news is that while individual parts of this technology are available, it will take time, investment and effort before an integrated and automatic system of systems solution is available. The most likely scenario is therefore a gradual increase in sensors, data and integration, while still relying on existing solutions to a degree. It is difficult to predict how fast such an approach will begin to pay dividends, since it is not only a question about the technological maturity, but also on the level of priority it is given and how cleverly it is done.
However, small steps are already taken. The Danish Navy is experimenting with the “Sail Drone” for surveillance and as NATO writes: “We are already witnessing big, big steps. For example, making the data cables as sensors. There is new technology—autonomous undersea vehicles that can manoeuvre around our critical infrastructure sites… While absolute protection is unrealistic, a layered approach can mitigate risk."
Drones and surveillance are not enough, however. The third step is therefore reaction and will often be done by manned platforms such as patrol craft or helicopters. This is due to the fact that drones cannot take people into custody or board a ship. Another reason is that the deterrence value in a standoff increases when you have people present and therefore something valuable at stake. Put simply, a frigate is better at taking control over a ship than a surveillance drone. Reaction can come in many forms. If surveillance and intelligence have been adequate, forces should ideally already have been dispatched and be ready to intervene to stop the attack. This happened during the spring of 2026 near Svalbard. Russian submarines and special craft were in the area, either training for or preparing seabed sabotage, but were detected by NATO forces who interrupted the mission before it could take place. The second-best option is to intervene right after an attack has occurred. In December 2025, the ship Fitburg cut cables in the Gulf of Finland by dragging its anchor. Finnish forces rapidly took control of the ship, whose captain and boatswain were subsequently sentenced to prison.
Sometimes, it will not be possible to react with military or law enforcement units because there are no forces nearby, or it will not be politically desirable due to fear of escalation. In these cases, it is nevertheless important that there is some sort of reaction, lest the attack go unpunished, which could embolden the adversary to launch more attacks. Some argue that in these cases, the EU or NATO should retaliate in kind with attacks on similar Russian targets. That, however, could prompt a Russian response and trigger an escalation spiral that is difficult to control. And it is also unnecessary. Rather than responding in kind, Western states can strike back asymmetrically where they hold leverage—by donating to Ukraine. Arguably, donating money to Ukraine’s war effort is the most effective way to hurt Russia while still maintaining the highest degree of control over events. This is what Denmark did during the fall of 2026 in the aftermath of an incident where a Russian frigate had shot flares at a Danish helicopter. The Danish response was to hasten a large donation to Ukraine.
It is difficult to defend against maritime hybrid war. But it is not impossible, as these examples demonstrate. The combination of resilience, surveillance, and reaction—whether military or political—can impose consequences on an attacker while simultaneously minimizing the impact of the attacks. Importantly, the defense does not have to prevail every time. It is unrealistic to assume that all attacks can be defended against. Rather, the point is to deter further attacks by adding sufficient risk and cost to hybrid operations.
About the author:
Alexander With is commander (OF-3) in the Royal Danish Navy and military analyst at the Royal Danish Defence College. His website is https://www.alexanderwith.dk