An effective air defense for Ukraine
The terrible airstrikes on Ukrainian cities on Monday that also hit a pediatric hospital has again raised the question of how to improve the air defenses so such things can’t happen. Unfortunately, no air defense system is flawless, and it will never be possible to reduce the number of successful attacks to zero. But it is possible to create more robust systems where a lower number of missiles will get through, and the attacks will require more resources from the Russians.
The point about the resource pull on the Russians is important. In the beginning of the war, the Russians were drawing on their stockpiles of missiles and drones when conducting air raids on Ukraine. By now Russia does not have any significant stockpiles left. They do have spare missiles for an emergency situation, but in general we have come to a point where Russia can only use as many missiles and drones on Ukraine as they can produce on a running basis. They are therefore not able to attack so often because they have to save up missiles before an attack.
For a missile attack to be successful, it is necessary to overwhelm the Ukrainian air defenses. This means that the Russians will have to use a large number of missiles and drones so the Ukrainians don’t have the capacity to shoot all of them down. For example, in this attack where the pediatric hospital was hit, Russia launched 38 missiles, and the Ukrainians shot down 30 of them. All the damage was caused by the eight missiles that got through the air defense umbrella, and we can only speculate about how many of the remaining 30 missiles that had the coordinates of hospitals, maternity clinics, elementary schools, and supermarkets stored in their targeting computer.
On Tuesday, President Biden announced that the Western countries will provide five more strategic air defense systems to Ukraine: four Patriot systems and one SAMP/T (which is a European system with many of the same characteristics as Patriot). That is definitely an important and welcome addition to the Ukrainian air defenses, but in reality there are many elements in a robust air defense system, and it will require more than Patriot to deal effectively with the threat of Russian missiles.
Ground-based systems
The cornerstone in a solid air defense system is obviously ground-based systems that shoot down the incoming aircraft, drones, and missiles. For that to work, you need two things: sensors that can detect the incoming missile and effectors (i.e. air defense missiles) that can shoot them down.
You will typically apply a layered approach where different types of systems supplement each other. Long-range systems such as Patriot can detect the incoming missiles and engage the threat on a big distance. This dramatically increases the chances of success because there is more time to engage, and you can evaluate the effect of the engagement and potentially shoot a second salvo if the first one didn’t work. The most modern versions of Patriot can also engage at high altitudes and protect against ballistic missiles, which most air defense systems cannot do.
However, long-range air defense systems are expensive, and they are not perfect. Some missiles will get through, so you cannot just place a Patriot system and expect a city to be protected. And also, you have to evaluate the nature of the threat and decide whether it is really worth the costs of an expensive Patriot missile. For example, if the incoming threat is a simple Shahed drone, then you will probably let it pass and shoot it down with a cheaper system.
For those reasons, you also need medium and short range air defense systems. Ukraine will need a variety of air defense systems with different capabilities, ranging from the strategic systems that Biden was talking about and all the way down to machine gun based systems like the German Gepard or portable MANPADS. And Ukraine needs all the systems. There is really no area where we can say that Ukraine has enough, so they need pretty much everything that can shoot down things that are flying.
Fighter jets
One of the weaknesses with ground-based air defense systems is that the sensors are looking upwards. Typically they use a radar that is placed on the ground and looks into the sky. This makes it impossible to detect low-flying threats that hide behind the radar horizon or terrain features such as hills. Russia took advantage of that fact in this week’s attack by having some of the incoming cruise missiles flying at a lower altitude than normally. According to a statement from a Ukrainian official as low as 50 m above the ground.
To deal with this threat, you can use a radar on an aircraft that looks down on the ground. F-16s can therefore play an important role in improving the missile defense of Ukrainian cities by covering a hole in the coverage that a Patriot system provides. F-16s can both detect an incoming cruise missile and engage it with air-to-air missiles or its 20 mm gun.
Right now, Ukraine’s focus is obviously on getting the first F-16s operational, and having just a few aircraft will not make a huge difference for the air defense of Ukraine. But in the coming time we will probably hear President Zelensky making the argument that the Western countries should provide more F-16s to Ukraine as a means to protect Ukrainian cities against Russian missile attacks.
Offensive air defense
The methods mentioned above are all defensive in nature. They aim to neutralize the effect of Russian attacks, but they don’t prevent the attacks as such. If all Ukraine can do is to shoot down the Russian missiles, and Russia can produce a significant number of missiles every month, then this dynamic can in principle continue indefinitely. Ukraine might be able to defend themselves against more Russian missiles, but some of them will still get through and hit their targets, and over time it will become a resource drain on both Ukraine and the West to produce all these air defense missiles.
To effectively address the threat from Russian missiles, it is not enough with such a defensive approach. It is necessary to also limit Russia’s ability to launch the missiles in the first place. This means hitting Russian bomber aircraft when they are parked on airbases inside of Russia, and it means actively tracing and destroying ground-based launchers of Iskander missiles.
The biggest obstacle to this type of offensive air defense is the American hesitation to allow Ukraine to use American weapons for deep strikes on Russian territory. President Biden has allowed Ukraine to use American weapons to hit on Russian territory but only in the vicinity of the border. This means the Russian airbases are off-limits for Ukraine, and that Russian aircraft can still operate from a safe haven.
An effective air defense means that you don’t give the enemy a safe haven for airbases and logistics required for airstrikes. It is somewhat paradoxical that the two strongest suppliers of air defense systems to Ukraine – Germany and the U.S. – have also been so reluctant to provide long-range strike capabilities. The U. S. now finally does provide ATACMS missiles, but seemingly in limited quantities, and Ukraine is in practical terms limited to using these missiles in Crimea. And Germany – for reasons that are difficult to understand – still refuses to provide Taurus missiles for the Ukrainians. To build an effective air defense in Ukraine, it is necessary to change the perception of these long-range missiles and to understand that they play a role in defending Ukrainian cities against Russian attacks.