Ammunition depots and the strategic value of ranged attacks

Over the last week, Ukrainian long-range airstrikes have caused massive explosions in ammunition warehouses in Russia. On Wednesday, an ammunition storage was hit in the Russian Tver Oblast near the border to Latvia, and on Saturday another two other storage depots were targeted: one in the Krasnodar Krai close to Crimea and another in the Tver Oblast again. The explosions were big enough to create mushroom clouds, and there are estimates that Russia may have lost a total of 40,000 tons of ammunition. 

As usual, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, they successfully managed to engage all the incoming drones, so everything was shot down. Unfortunately, some drone debris created a fire, which caused the explosions. It has become a standing joke among observers of the Ukraine war that the most dangerous weapon the Ukrainians have appears to be drone debris. 

The attacks were significant for several reasons. They demonstrate Ukraine’s improving capability to conduct these strikes and highlight the difficulty the Russians have in establishing a reliable air defense. They also demonstrate that Ukraine has the intelligence capabilities required to select the right targets for these airstrikes, because they are hitting the Russians in some of the places where it hurts the most.

The most remarkable aspect of these attacks, however, is not so much that Ukraine was able to reach these storage facilities with drones, but that the ammunition was stored in places where it was vulnerable to a drone strike. The storage facility that was hit on Wednesday was opened in 2018. On that occasion, the then Deputy Defense Minister, Dmitry Bulgakov, claimed that the structures of the facility were strong enough to withstand a direct nuclear attack. Now it turns out that the structures were not even strong enough to withstand a drone strike (or a strike with “drone debris”). 

Deputy defense minister Dmitry Bulgakov explaining how the storage facility in Tver was constructed to withstand a direct nuclear attack. That was in 2018 – now he is under arrest on charges of corruption.

Satellite images have revealed that much of the ammunition was apparently not stored in bunkers but rather in wooden houses or sheds. Incidentally, Bulgakov was arrested on charges of blatant corruption in July, and I guess there are good reasons for thinking that the charges are justified. Even in Russia, if you pay for a nuclear bunker and get a wooden shed, that is over the top of what can be considered an acceptable level of corruption. 

The value of ranged attacks

The attacks on the ammunition storage facilities have created quite an uproar among the Russian military bloggers who cover the war. As one of them commented, “This is not how you win a war.” That is true. Maintaining secure supply lines is one of the most important tasks for any military engaged in a war of attrition. These attacks will have a direct impact on the availability of ammunition for the soldiers on the front lines. They could potentially experience a shortage of ammunition that will last for months due to the loss of the ammunition that was destroyed. In addition, the Russian military will now also have to adjust to the fact that these storage facilities played an important role in the logistics chain. 

One of the strange things about the media coverage of this war is the focus on the control of territory. It gets a lot of media coverage when the Russian forces take a bit of land in Donetsk or some other place along the front line, and we regularly see alarmist headlines about how Russia is about to take this or that “strategic” city. But as I and other analysts have pointed out, it really doesn’t change the fundamental dynamics of the war as long as both sides still have a capable fighting force. If you want to win the war, you ultimately have to destroy the enemy’s ability to continue fighting. 

The Ukrainian attacks on Russian ammunition depots aim to do exactly that. Ukraine is targeting the capabilities of the Russian army rather than focusing on defending or retaking every square kilometer of land at this point. If Ukraine can continue doing this over time, it will have a true strategic effect. 

ATACMS will still make a difference

The strikes on the Russian ammunition storages effectively challenge one of the most important arguments that American and German politicians have used for not providing long-range weapons to Ukraine: That Ukraine does not need these weapons and that the resources for military help are better used by providing capabilities that Ukraine could use to win the battle along the frontline.

This argument was nonsensical from the start. Both the United States and Germany have military doctrines that heavily rely on the use of ranged weapons to target the logistics of the enemy. It is obviously a better idea to destroy the enemy’s weapons before they reach the frontline than to fight the enemy while he is shooting at you with those weapons. Last week’s attacks mean that there are 40,000 tons of Russian ammunition that will never hit Ukrainian soldiers or civilians. 

It will still make a difference if Ukraine is allowed to use Storm Shadow missiles or ATACMS for strikes inside Russia. There is speculation that the policy on this could change in Washington during the coming week, and that would increase the amount of available capabilities for conducting such strikes. There are plenty of valid and important targets within a range of a few hundred kilometers from Ukraine where ATACMS could make a big difference. It would also free up Ukraine's own longer-range capabilities for targets that are outside ATACMS range.

But while we are still waiting for an American decision, it is good to see that Ukraine has built a variety of drones and missiles that enable them to conduct ranged attacks on their own.