You cannot win a hybrid war without taking risks

By Alexander With

Despite a long series of hybrid attacks against Europe, European governments have been remarkably cautious in their response. Not all incidents with clear Russian fingerprints have been officially attributed to Moscow. Others have been attributed, but even then, retaliation has rarely gone beyond words. Russia, never easily deterred by rhetoric alone, has continued its hybrid campaign unabated.

Europe and NATO have, so far, failed to deter hybrid aggression—or at least, failed to deter it at its current intensity. Russia still possesses far greater capacity for hybrid operations than it has yet employed. We have only seen the tip of the iceberg.

In that sense, it could be argued that while Russia has not been deterred from carrying out hybrid attacks, it has been restrained from launching large-scale, deadly assaults that might trigger NATO’s Article 5.

This raises an obvious question: how can Europe and NATO defend themselves against a constant stream of hybrid attacks which, though troublesome and unsettling, are unlikely to cross the Article 5 threshold?

If deterrence has faltered at the strategic level, then defence has failed at the tactical one. Russian drones, aircraft and ships have repeatedly violated NATO airspace and territorial waters with little reaction. Only in Poland have intruding drones actually been shot down—and even that ended in embarrassment. Out of some twenty something drones, only four were destroyed. Multi-million-dollar F-35s were used to down cheap, mass-produced drones, and one missile intended for a drone hit a Polish house instead.

In Copenhagen, matters were worse still. Authorities warned of drones over the airport but appeared unable to respond effectively. In the following hours and days, drone sightings disrupted Danish infrastructure in several instances. Similarly, drones recently disrupted airports in Belgium, again apparently without the authorities being able to counter them. The German defence minister Boris Pistorious linked the drones to Russia and the ongoing debate whether to use frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine.

The deterrence and defence posture of NATO countries under attack resembles that of a boxer who does nothing but parry blows, never striking back. It may feel safe and de-escalatory in the short term, but it carries serious risks over time. An aggressor emboldened by his opponent’s restraint is more likely to escalate. Indeed, it could be argued that this is precisely how Russia has behaved—emboldened and escalatory. Europe’s current strategy seems to accept low-level hybrid attacks, hope they do not spiral, and simply buy time while supporting Ukraine. But what could be done differently?

At the tactical level, perpetrators must be identified and apprehended. This demands not only sound intelligence but also a willingness to take risks. Finland’s seizure of a ship suspected of cutting underwater cables may provide a useful precedent. In another instance, German authorities detained a Russian vessel near Kiel, suspected of launching drones over critical infrastructure.

Another challenge lies in the drones themselves. Shooting them down can be hazardous: the drone may crash unpredictably, and the munitions used could cause collateral damage. It is understandable that officials hesitate to “pull the trigger”. Yet if they never do, there is no tactical deterrence or defence—and Europe would, in effect, concede the initiative to the attacker. And one day, those drones may do more than merely observe.

Neutralising drones safely remains technologically difficult. Even when the necessary capabilities exist, attackers can simply strike where they do not located. Suppose Denmark deployed counter-drone systems at Copenhagen Airport; the attacker could simply target another airport. The hybrid aggressor will always enjoy an element of advantage, as no defender can protect everything, against every hybrid threat, all of the time. Additionally, while defensive measures and resilience might minimise the physical damage from the hybrid attack, the attack could still be successful in causing fear and disruption. The most effective deterrence, therefore, lies not at the tactical level but at the strategic one.

If Europe wishes to deter future attacks, it must respond with more than words. That does not mean responding in kind. Drones over Poland need not prompt Europe to send drones into Russia. Rather, Europe should act asymmetrically, where it truly hurts. For instance, if every hybrid attack automatically triggered a five-percent increase in aid to Ukraine, Russia would quickly acquire a strong incentive to stop its hybrid war.

Europe could also transfer frozen Russian assets to Ukraine or tighten economic sanctions further. Even now, some European firms continue to operate in Russia, indirectly supporting the Kremlin’s war effort. The most effective sanctions would probably be to sanction countries trading with Russia, akin to the recent sanctions made by the Trump administration. Such sanctions would risk reprisals and trade wars, but as seen with the recent Indian import stop of Russian oil, it could also be effective. Europe has yet to exhaust its economic arsenal. Finally, Europe could prohibit the hundreds of thousands of Russians travelling visiting the union each year.

The central point is this: for deterrence to work, there must be retaliation. And that, in turn, requires the willingness to take risks, both tactical and strategic. Without it, Europe can do little more than hope the situation does not escalate.

And hope, as any strategist knows, is not a strategy.

About the author:

Alexander With is commander (OF-3) in the Royal Danish Navy and military analyst at the Royal Danish Defence College. His website is https://www.alexanderwith.dk