What is Ukraine saving its missiles for?

In this video, I discuss President Zelensky's announcement that attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure this winter will be met with similar attacks on the Russian power grid. This is interesting because it means that Ukraine is venturing into the area of military deterrence rather than just ongoing warfighting, and it indicates that the power balance may be shifting in Ukraine's favor. It may also explain why we haven't seen Ukraine's powerful Flamingo missiles in more extensive use since they were originally announced back in August.

Watch the video here or read the transcript below.

Best,
Anders


Transcript:

For a while, there's been a focus on Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities, including their drones and long-range missiles, and how they've been using these to target Russia's war economy, particularly the oil production facilities. Recently, however, we've seen Ukraine start to leverage this capability in a different and in an interesting way that actually resembles what in military terms would be called deterrence by punishment. This is fascinating, not only in terms of what Ukraine is trying to achieve, but also in what it says about how Ukraine perceives its own strength and that they feel confident in the power that they now have. So let's talk about it.

The development of Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities is one of the most fascinating advancements throughout the war, particularly in terms of military production and how it changes the dynamics of the conflict. This is not a type of capability that Ukraine had when the full-scale invasion began in 2022. Russia's had this ability to strike wherever they wanted on Ukrainian territory throughout the entire war. But Ukraine has only achieved that within the last year or two.

And it's something that they've achieved because they recognized early on that this would be crucial for their long-term ability to end the war on favorable terms. They knew that this would be necessary to bring Russia to the negotiating table with a realistic mindset. So, they put in the necessary resources to make it happen.

Over the summer here of 2025, it's really become clear that Ukraine now possesses this capability and that they have it in sufficient quantity to also really start putting pressure on Russia. So, we've seen Ukraine start to more systematically target Russia's war economy, especially by going after the fuel production facilities in Russia. So we've seen many repeated attacks on oil refineries in particular.

But over the last couple of weeks, we've also seen another use of these long-range missiles that I think is interesting. It's especially tied to the development of the Flamingo missile, which was officially announced initially back in August, and it's attracted a lot of attention in the media. The Flamingo missile is a large cruise missile and it has a range of about 3,000 kilometers and it carries a warhead that is weighing about 1,000 kilograms. So it's a very big and powerful missile. In many ways, it could actually be compared to the American Tomahawk missile, which many people are probably familiar with. It has many similar characteristics.

The Flamingo missile has been used in real life. We've seen a single strike with it that we know for sure involved the Flamingo missile, but there might also be others where it's been used where we're not quite sure that that's it. But in any case, it's safe to say that when it comes to actual combat use, the use of this missile has been limited. And that is interesting because at the same time, Ukraine claims that they are producing about 50 of these missiles per month and that they are ramping up production so that by January, they expect to reach about 200 Flamingo missiles every month.

Now, it's been about two months since August. So, what are they actually doing with all these missiles? Where are they? With the very limited number of strikes we've seen, it's easy to get the idea that perhaps Ukraine is saving them for something.

And then, last week, President Zelensky made an interesting announcement. He said that now that we are approaching winter, if Russia again, this winter, as they've done the last three winters, tries to target Ukraine's critical infrastructure, then Ukraine is going to do the same to Russia. So if Russia forces the lights in Kyiv to go out, then Ukraine is going to turn off the lights in Moscow. So he's indicating that there's going to be sort of an eye-for-an-eye approach when it comes to attacks on energy infrastructure this winter.

Then, more or less the next day, Russia actually launched an attack on a Ukrainian power plant, and Ukraine responded immediately with an attack on a Russian power plant in the city of Belgorod. So, that disrupted the electricity for, I think, about 100,000 people.

I'm not here going to go deep into the legal questions of what it means to target energy infrastructure. That's not actually something you're allowed to do. So, when Ukraine does it, that is against the conventions. But I think at the same time, it's really hard to judge the Ukrainians on this issue when you consider that they're up against an enemy that's been doing this for the last three years. And now it looks like they're going to do it for the fourth year in a row. So there just comes a point when enough is enough and you do what you can to try to make it stop.

And then again, it also ties into the question of what is it actually that Ukraine is trying to achieve with this. Ukraine is not doing this because they want ordinary Russians to be without power or fresh water or sanitation or all the other things that you miss when you don't have electricity in a city. That's not the goal. It's not actually the goal to make ordinary Russians suffer.

What Ukraine seems to be doing is to ensure that Russia does not target their energy infrastructure. And that means that we are now actually in the realm of deterrence rather than actual warfighting. What Ukraine is trying to create here is a deterrent effect, that the Russians will look at this and know that if they target specific things in Ukraine, then they will be hit with something else that they would rather avoid. And therefore, they're not going to do it. That's the idea.

And this is, I think, fascinating. It's actually quite a power move from the Ukrainians to make this statement because it shows that they now feel that they have the power not only to be fighting Russia, but to also deter Russia from certain actions. They have the means necessary to inflict such significant pain on Russian society that they can start playing the deterrence game.

Now, I don't think it's necessarily going to work, at least not in the short term. Putin is not really the kind of guy to be deterred by Ukraine. And the problem is also that this is a very important part of the Russian strategy for how they think they're going to win the war or how they can apply pressure on Ukrainian society over time so that the Ukrainians lose the determination to continue fighting.

So, I think we're going to see Russia try to take out Ukraine's energy infrastructure also this year. And in fact, since those first attacks, we have seen Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. And it will be interesting to see how the Ukrainians react to this, whether they will actually put actions behind their words, and if they will start a significant campaign against Russian energy infrastructure as a kind of retaliation for the attacks that the Russians are doing on them.

But I will say that I do think it looks like Ukraine is building up stockpiles of their most powerful long-range missiles for a campaign over the winter. It's quite possible that this is exactly what they have in mind, that these new flamingo missiles are not, in fact, at this point, intended for the ongoing campaign to target the Russian war economy and their oil refineries, but rather that this is intended for this task of deterrence by punishment over the winter.

Recently, there's been some talk about whether Donald Trump would be willing to sell Ukraine some Tomahawk missiles. I think that's probably not going to happen. It doesn't look likely. But this is also a type of missile that would fit neatly into this deterrence by punishment task. Ukraine's problem is that they might not have the necessary quantity of missiles at this point to actually follow through on the threats that they're making, or at least not to do it sufficiently forcefully to actually influence Russian thinking.

If we say that they have made 50 missiles per month since August, then at most they would have a couple of hundred by now. And that is perhaps not enough to sufficiently deter Russia from attempting a campaign against Ukrainian power plants and other energy infrastructure. I think Ukraine would like to supplement their own supplies with some Tomahawk missiles just to make sure they have enough.

But in either case, it looks like Ukraine has some quite ambitious plans with the long-range capabilities that they have now and how they're going to use that, not just for targeting significant things in the Russian war economy, but also for military coercion. Ukraine is trying to force Russia to follow their demands from a position of military strength.

So, I don't know if this is going to work or if it's actually going to prevent the Russians from attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure. I'm also unsure if Ukraine has the necessary capability to respond in this eye-for-an-eye principle. However, I do think it's interesting that Ukraine is now in a position where they are starting to act more confidently and to rely on their military strength, not just to respond to Russian aggression, but to actually start setting the agenda. So, it raises some questions about the power relationship at this point and how the war is going to develop in the future. We're now about three and a half years into the war. What's it going to look like in a year's time? Are these the early signs that the balance is tipping more permanently? These are some of the interesting questions that I think arise when we see Zelensky making statements like that. And when we observe the kinds of capabilities, such as the Flamingo missile that Ukraine is now apparently stockpiling, it puts Ukraine in a position where they can leverage other tools in the military toolbox, such as military coercion and deterrent strategies.

And finally, before I finish, I also just want to raise a question or briefly discuss that there is the question about how is the Russian civilian population going to react if Ukraine actually starts responding in kind to these attacks on civilian energy infrastructure. Russian attacks on Ukraine's power grid haven't really worked in the sense that they have not significantly weakened Ukrainian morale or determination to keep fighting. But would it work the other way around? I think a good argument could actually be made that the Russian population is probably less prepared for such attacks on their energy infrastructure and that they would be less resilient. So, it could potentially weaken popular support for the war inside of Russia.

And that's probably a topic for a different video. I will definitely make that video if there is a big Ukrainian campaign against Russian power plants and it actually materializes. But at this point, I will just say that I think there would be a certain irony to it if it turns out that Russia's strategy of targeting energy infrastructure didn't have the desired effect of weakening morale in Ukraine, but that it actually did work the other way around in Russia when Ukraine responded.

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