Chinese hybrid warfare in the Baltic Sea

On Saturday, the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3 weighed anchor from its position in the Danish Sea of Kattegat and continued its journey to Port Said, Egypt. This ship is suspected of sabotaging two data cables in the Baltic Sea on November 17. One of the data cables runs from Finland to Germany, and the other from Sweden to Lithuania.

The Chinese ship was quickly identified as a suspect based on its maneuvers and position at the time of the sabotage. It was therefore followed closely during its passage through Danish waters while exiting the Baltic Sea, and upon passing the Danish Straits, it dropped anchor in Kattegat. This marked the beginning of a protracted diplomatic struggle, where the governments of Sweden, Lithuania, Finland, and Germany wanted to inspect the vessel, but the Chinese flag state was reluctant to allow them to do so.

I do not have inside information on the incident or the operations connected to Yi Peng 3, but I have worked for several years in the branch of the Danish Navy that can be characterized as the Danish Coast Guard. I therefore thought I would share a few reflections on what I think might be happening, what we could expect going forward, and what it says about China’s involvement in Russian hybrid warfare.

Second case in one year

The first thing to note is that this is not the first time a Chinese ship is suspected of committing sabotage in the Baltic Sea during the war in Ukraine. In October 2023, the Chinese bulk carrier Newnew Polar Bear destroyed the Balticconnector gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia by dragging its anchor over it. At the time, the ship was not stopped while exiting the Baltic Sea, and Western countries were unable to conduct a thorough inspection. However, Chinese authorities later acknowledged that the ship damaged the pipeline, although they claim it was an accident.

The case with Yi Peng 3 is therefore the second such incident in just over a year in the Baltic Sea, where a Chinese ship dragged its anchor across the seabed for miles, destroying critical infrastructure. And just to be clear, it's pretty much impossible for this to happen by accident. It is theoretically possible for a ship to lose its anchor, but the idea that the crew wouldn't notice and would just keep sailing for a long distance is quite absurd. It would require a very deliberate effort to keep a ship on course while dragging its anchor along the seabed.

While Yi Peng 3 was at anchor in Kattegat, it attracted a lot of media attention. Such a ship has two anchors: one was on the seabed while the other was visible for the TV cameras to photograph. I think it's pretty clear from these photographs that something is wrong with the anchor that we can see. It is bent in a strange fashion, indicating that it has been under massive strain and that extreme forces have been applied to it. This indicates that the anchor quite likely was dragged along the seabed while the ship was pulling it with all the power the engine could produce.

Another thing the press discovered was that Yi Peng 3 conducted some strange maneuvers on its way into the Baltic Sea a few weeks before the data cables were broken. It appears they also tried to destroy some cables running between the Danish island of Læsø and the Swedish coastline. They didn't succeed, but a Danish TV crew was able to get footage of the trails on the seabed, showing that an anchor had been dragged across the positions of some important power lines.

Maritime law and a diplomatic standoff

From an international law perspective, it was an interesting case. International shipping is always difficult because many different countries are involved, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea makes it challenging for states to interfere with the passage of ships from other nations. Yi Peng 3 was anchored in international waters in Kattegat; therefore, the Danish government did not have full jurisdiction to dictate the events.

I think what happened was that the European countries made it clear to the Chinese government that they were not going to let it slip this time. Even though the ship might not have been in the territorial waters of any of the countries involved, a strong argument could be made that the conditions for hot pursuit were met in this case. The European countries probably made it clear to China that they were going to pursue the case and board the ship no matter what, and that China's opportunity to avoid a diplomatic scandal was to cooperate.

This is how Yi Peng 3 ended up being anchored in Kattegat for a month. First, there had to be protracted diplomatic negotiations between China and the involved European states. After that, an actual inspection of the ship had to take place.

That happened on the 19th of December, when a Chinese delegation officially conducted an inspection on their own ship with inspectors from Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Lithuania following along as observers. A Danish representative participated to coordinate the logistics. After the inspection, the Chinese ship was allowed to continue its journey.

What now?

There's been quite a bit of speculation about the possible consequences and whether the captain, for example, will be charged with sabotage. I think it's quite likely that it will continue in the court system as a civil case, where the main question is about liability for the damages. This would essentially mean that the Scandinavian countries had agreed to consider the case an accident rather than deliberate sabotage. However, having to pay for repairing the data cables will probably be sufficiently expensive and embarrassing to deter repeat offenses from Chinese ships.

The case raises an interesting question about China's role in Russia's hybrid warfare campaign against the West. How can Russia persuade Chinese captains to commit sabotage while transiting the Baltic Sea? On the one hand, it's unlikely that this could happen without at least the tacit approval of the Chinese government. However, the month-long diplomatic standoff also shows that China is not fully committed to Russian hybrid warfare and that they have an interest in being seen as cooperative by Western governments.

So, once again, we see China's peculiar position between Russia and the West in relation to the war in Ukraine. They would like to help Russia because they share foreign policy goals with the Russian government related to broader ambitions for a multipolar world order. But at the same time, they are currently too dependent on trade with Western countries, and the Russian cause is not important enough for them to risk a large confrontation with the West.